The power of verification for greedy mechanism design

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11215zbMATH Open1452.91071OpenAlexW2863753151WikidataQ129510456 ScholiaQ129510456MaRDI QIDQ4580271FDOQ4580271

Authors: Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre 

Publication date: 14 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11215

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zbMATH Keywords

greedy algorithmsmechanism designcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Algorithms in computer science (68W99) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cited In (8)

• Verified learning without regret. From algorithmic game theory to distributed systems with mechanized complexity guarantees
• On the limitations of greedy mechanism design for truthful combinatorial auctions
• Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Incentivized Verifiable Computation System
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Evaluating strategic structures in multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning

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