The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design
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Publication:4580271
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11215zbMATH Open1452.91071OpenAlexW2863753151WikidataQ129510456 ScholiaQ129510456MaRDI QIDQ4580271FDOQ4580271
Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre, Dimitris Fotakis
Publication date: 14 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11215
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Algorithms in computer science (68W99) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cited In (6)
- Verified learning without regret. From algorithmic game theory to distributed systems with mechanized complexity guarantees
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evaluating Strategic Structures in Multi-Agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning
- Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Incentivized Verifiable Computation System
- Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
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