scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323

zbMATH Open1425.91194arXiv1108.4744MaRDI QIDQ5743445FDOQ5743445

Authors: Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline 

Publication date: 10 May 2019

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4744

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (6)

• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Consensus mechanism with maximum-return modifications and minimum-cost feedback: a perspective of game theory
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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