scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323

MaRDI QIDQ5743445zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date 10 May 2019

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4744, https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2095187

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
• Mechanism design with approximate valuations
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
• Multidimensional mechanism design: finite-dimensional approximations and efficient computation
• The complexity of optimal mechanism design

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079342 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Revenue maximization with a single sample

Cited in

(6)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Consensus mechanism with maximum-return modifications and minimum-cost feedback: a perspective of game theory
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments

This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5743445)