Consensus mechanism with maximum-return modifications and minimum-cost feedback: a perspective of game theory
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.04.014zbMath1487.91034OpenAlexW3024532693MaRDI QIDQ2023928
Bowen Zhang, Hengjie Zhang, Witold Pedrycz, Yucheng Dong
Publication date: 3 May 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.04.014
group decisions and negotiationsdifferential evolutionStackelberg gamecompensation strategyconsensus mechanism
Decision theory (91B06) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Group preferences (91B10)
Related Items (13)
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A peer-to-peer dynamic adaptive consensus reaching model for the group AHP decision making
- Distance-based consensus models for fuzzy and multiplicative preference relations
- Modeling the minimum cost consensus problem in an asymmetric costs context
- Some induced ordered weighted averaging operators and their use for solving group decision-making problems based on fuzzy preference relations
- Some properties of the bilevel programming problem
- The OWA-based consensus operator under linguistic representation models using position indexes
- Group decision making under multiple criteria. Methods and applications
- Differential evolution -- a simple and efficient heuristic for global optimization over continuous spaces
- Multilevel decision-making: a survey
- Consensus efficiency in group decision making: a comprehensive comparative study and its optimal design
- A note on the internal consistency of various preference representations
- A solution to bi/tri-level programming problems using particle swarm optimization
- Managing consensus based on leadership in opinion dynamics
- On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
- Two consensus models based on the minimum cost and maximum return regarding either all individuals or one individual
- Computational Difficulties of Bilevel Linear Programming
- A Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility
- Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
- A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems
- Group decision making in a multiple criteria environment: A case using the AHP in software selection
This page was built for publication: Consensus mechanism with maximum-return modifications and minimum-cost feedback: a perspective of game theory