Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
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Publication:6100484
Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
Cited in
(8)- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Mechanism design without quasilinearity
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