Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
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Publication:6100484
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102831zbMATH Open1519.91079OpenAlexW3085286943MaRDI QIDQ6100484FDOQ6100484
Authors: Hitoshi Matsushima, Shunya Noda 
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102831
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Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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- Efficient Auctions
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
Cited In (8)
- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Mechanism design without quasilinearity
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