Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4021530
DOI10.2307/2297997zbMath0760.90024OpenAlexW2025826049WikidataQ56803977 ScholiaQ56803977MaRDI QIDQ4021530
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/873.pdf
Related Items (21)
The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions ⋮ Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Holdup, search, and inefficiency ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information ⋮ Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation ⋮ On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Strategic disaggregation in matching markets ⋮ Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach ⋮ Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty ⋮ Creative bargaining ⋮ Managing strategic inventories under investment in process improvement ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
This page was built for publication: Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
