Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
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Publication:4021530
DOI10.2307/2297997zbMath0760.90024WikidataQ56803977 ScholiaQ56803977MaRDI QIDQ4021530
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/873.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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