Investment incentives in bilateral trading

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.006MaRDI QIDQ645662zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stephanie Lau

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

\(k\)-double auctionsbilateral tradingincomplete contractsinvestment incentivesopt-out clauseoptimal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information

Cites work

• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Investment incentives in bilateral trading
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

Cited in

(6)

• Investment and bilateral insurance
• The international trade effects of bilateral investment treaties
• Pre-trade private investments
• Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
• An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
• Investment incentives in bilateral trading

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