Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
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Recommendations
- A dynamic theory of holdup.
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
Cited in
(40)- Creative bargaining
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
- Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
- Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common?
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
- Strategic disaggregation in matching markets
- Managing strategic inventories under investment in process improvement
- Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
- The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
- The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting
- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
- Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
- Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
- On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising
- A dynamic theory of holdup.
- Destructing the hold-up
- Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Holdup, search, and inefficiency
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Investment incentives in bilateral trading
- Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Bargaining foundations for price taking in matching markets
- Coinvestment games under uncertainty
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem
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