Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2008.00844.XMaRDI QIDQ3506466zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 13 June 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0627.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

Cited in

(12)

• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
• Contracting for dynamic efficiency
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• Moral hazard in data envelopment analysis benchmarking

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