Contracting for dynamic efficiency

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1675MaRDI QIDQ3161840zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Calcott, Vladimir P. Petkov

Publication date 18 October 2010

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1675

zbMATH Keywords

contract damagesefficiencyMarkov-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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• Capacity accumulation games with technology constraints
• Self-evident events and the value of linking
• A Negishi approach to recursive contracts
• Implementation in dynamic job transfers

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