Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem

DOI10.3982/TE2127zbMath1396.91365OpenAlexW2282230947MaRDI QIDQ4682755

Péter Eső, Balázs Szentes

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2127

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmechanism designdynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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