Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
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Publication:2231387
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105307zbMath1471.91173OpenAlexW3175235838MaRDI QIDQ2231387
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105307
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Cites Work
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