Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105307zbMath1471.91173OpenAlexW3175235838MaRDI QIDQ2231387

Zijia Wang, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105307

zbMATH Keywords

outside optiondynamic mechanism designprice matchingprice searchsearch deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic mechanism design on social networks

Cites Work

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• Search Deterrence
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks
• Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
• Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information
• Optimal dynamic contracting: The first‐order approach and beyond
• Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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