Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.007zbMATH Open1483.91056OpenAlexW3213434956MaRDI QIDQ2078034FDOQ2078034
Authors: Dawen Meng, Lei Sun, Guoqiang Tian 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.007
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Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cited In (7)
- Dynamic competition over social networks
- A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- Optimal signaling of content accuracy: engagement vs. misinformation
- Social networks from a designer's viewpoint
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Smart contract-driven mechanism design to mitigate information diffusion in social networks
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