Dynamic mechanism design on social networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.007MaRDI QIDQ2078034zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dawen Meng, Lei Sun, Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

social networknonlinear pricingdynamic mechanism designexperience goodkey linkkey nodenetwork intervention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Online mechanisms
• Dynamic communication mechanism design

Cites work

• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach
• Fiscal rules and discretion under persistent shocks
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Monopoly and product quality
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal contracting in networks
• Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
• Search deterrence
• Sequential screening
• Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)
• Social and economic networks.
• Social norms in networks
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
• The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Cited in

(8)

• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Smart contract-driven mechanism design to mitigate information diffusion in social networks
• An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
• Social networks from a designer's viewpoint
• Dynamic competition over social networks
• A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
• Technical Note—Dynamic Mechanism Design with Capacity Constraint
• Optimal signaling of content accuracy: engagement vs. misinformation

This page was built for publication: Dynamic mechanism design on social networks

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2078034)