Optimal contracting in networks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.07.017MaRDI QIDQ2324838zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ali Jadbabaie, A. Kakhbod

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.017

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationinformation rentnetwork economicsbilateral contractsmultilateral contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Contracting with Externalities
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Targeting in networks under costly agreements
• Group targeting under networked synergies
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

Cites work

• Bayesian learning in social networks
• Competitive targeted advertising over networks
• Contracting with Externalities
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Efficient networks in games with local complementarities
• Handbook of game theory. Vol. 4
• How homophily affects the speed of learning and best-response dynamics
• Key leaders in social networks
• Monopoly and product quality
• Monopoly pricing and diffusion of social network goods
• Network games
• Optimal pricing in networks with externalities
• Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
• Pricing network effects
• Public goods in networks
• Social and economic networks.
• The network origins of aggregate fluctuations
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Cited in

(10)

• Competitive pricing under local network effects
• Targeting in networks under costly agreements
• Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
• Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
• Cost allocation protocols for supply contract design in network situations
• STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN NETWORKS
• Contracting in hierarchical platforms
• Group targeting under networked synergies
• Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
• A contract-based model for directed network formation

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