Targeting in networks under costly agreements

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.003zbMath1519.91157OpenAlexW4323659940MaRDI QIDQ6102573

Shahir Safi, Frédéric Deroïan, Mohamed Belhaj

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

linear schemeoptimal targetingnetworked synergies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Targeting in social networks with anonymized information

Cites Work

• Inverse \(M\)-matrices. II
• Key leaders in social networks
• Inverse M-matrices
• Targeting the key player: an incentive-based approach
• The value of network information: assortative mixing makes the difference
• In search of the densest subgraph
• The limit of targeting in networks
• Group targeting under networked synergies
• Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Inverse of Strictly Ultrametric Matrices are of Stieltjes Type
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• The dense \(k\)-subgraph problem

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