Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00425zbMath1152.91630OpenAlexW2109240499MaRDI QIDQ5472968

Michael D. Whinston, I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38668

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting ⋮ Menu theorems for bilateral contracting ⋮ Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships ⋮ Optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations ⋮ Moral hazard with excess returns ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? ⋮ Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences ⋮ Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria ⋮ The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining

This page was built for publication: Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities