On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.007zbMath1141.91391MaRDI QIDQ854939

Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.163.8799

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; contractual and informational externalities; exogenous and endogenous private information; optimal disclosure policies; sequential common agency games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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