Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2437835
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.007zbMath1283.91080MaRDI QIDQ2437835
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.007
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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