Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.08.007MaRDI QIDQ2437835zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Romans Pancs

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

buy-now pricesequential negotiationsstrategic bid disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
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• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Cites work

• A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Game theory
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Multistage Games with Communication
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal search auctions
• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Search mechanisms
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Cited in

(5)

• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly

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