On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
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Recommendations
- Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints
Cites work
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Contracting with Externalities
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Dynamic common agency.
- Game theory
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
(32)- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Stress tests and information disclosure
- Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation
- Information design in competitive insurance markets
- Perception games and privacy
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Privacy, patience, and protection
- The economics of data externalities
- The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
- Selling privacy at auction
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Privacy-constrained network formation
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
- Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Transparency of outside options in bargaining
- Vagueness and information-sharing
- Slow persuasion
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
- Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Credibly confidential contracts
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
- Adversarial coordination and public information design
- Auctions with signaling bidders: optimal design and information disclosure
- Selling signals
- Motivating loyal bureaucrats in sequential agency
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
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