Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information

DOI10.2307/2297529MaRDI QIDQ3773661zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 1988

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297529

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian revelation mechanismlocal incentive compatibilityrisk averse buyersecond-best distortionsseller

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(8)

• Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
• Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum
• Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204533 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

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