Robust contracting under common value uncertainty

DOI10.3982/TE2385MaRDI QIDQ4682726zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sarah Auster

Publication date 19 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2385

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitylemons problemoptimal contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Robust contracting in general contract spaces
• A note on robust procurement contracts
• Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information
• Robust screening under ambiguity
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

Cited in

(19)

• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information
• Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
• Robust contracting in general contract spaces
• A note on robust procurement contracts
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• A Complementarity Framework for Forward Contracting Under Uncertainty
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Robust incentives for risk
• Auction design with ambiguity: optimality of the first-price auction
• Robust product design and pricing
• Robustly optimal voting rule
• Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information
• Robust voting under uncertainty
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

This page was built for publication: Robust contracting under common value uncertainty

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4682726)