Robust incentives for risk

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102893MaRDI QIDQ6146430zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maxwell Rosenthal

Publication date 5 February 2024

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102893

zbMATH Keywords

risk takingrobust contractsuncertain risk preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Risk models (general) (91B05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent

Cites work

• Adverse selection under ignorance
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Sellers with misspecified models

Cited in

(2)

• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

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