Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
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Cited in
(21)- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
- Correlation-robust auction design
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces
- Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
- Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Robust incentives for risk
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Robust product design and pricing
- Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
- Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
- Information design in allocation with costly verification
- Robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple goods
- Information requirements for mechanism design
- On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
- Robustly optimal voting rule
- Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules
- Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information
- Robust voting under uncertainty
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