Robust voting under uncertainty
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Cites work
- A case for incomplete markets
- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3061365 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Majority rule and general decision rules
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
- On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Regular simple games
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
- Robust monopoly pricing
- Robust Statistics
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- The approximation of convex sets by polyhedra
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