Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
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- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Multidimensional screening.
- Maxmin implementation
- Robust pricing under strategic trading
- Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
- Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
- Selling two identical objects
- Correlation-robust auction design
- Robust mechanism design and production structure for assembly systems with asymmetric cost information
- Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer
- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
- Portfolio concentration, portfolio inertia, and ambiguous correlation
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty: an example
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Matching with partners and projects
- Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
- Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Learning optimal forecast aggregation in partial evidence environments
- Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust screening under ambiguity
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Price discrimination with robust beliefs
- Robust incentives for risk
- Screening while controlling an externality
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Auction design with heterogeneous priors
- Selling two complementary goods
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Screening with limited information: a dual perspective
- On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening
- Data-driven contract design
- Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
- A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem
- Multi-dimensional screening: buyer-optimal learning and informational robustness
- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
- Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination
- Bayesian optimal stopping with maximum value knowledge
- Robust product design and pricing
- Optimal job assignment with spillover effects
- Robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple goods
- Correlation concern
- Undominated monopoly regulation
- Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions
- Distributionally robust optimization
- Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting
- Multidimensional screening with precise seller information
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Robustly optimal voting rule
- Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules
- Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information
- Robust voting under uncertainty
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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