Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8MaRDI QIDQ2152109zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors I. Caragiannis, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang, N. V. Gravin

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationauctionsbipartite matchingprophet inequalityposted pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 67295 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 819814 (Why is no real title available?)
• Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
• Correlation-robust analysis of single item auction
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Random graphs.
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget
• Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory

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