Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8OpenAlexW4205256144MaRDI QIDQ2152109FDOQ2152109

Authors: I. Caragiannis, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang, N. V. Gravin 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationauctionsbipartite matchingprophet inequalityposted pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Random graphs.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
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• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
• Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
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• Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction

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