Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
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Cites work
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
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- Cores of convex games
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- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
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Cited in
(11)- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Maxmin implementation
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Strategic ambiguity in global games
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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