Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
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Publication:5475057
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.xzbMath1141.91400MaRDI QIDQ5475057
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.x
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
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