Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.004zbMATH Open1330.91133OpenAlexW1999433152MaRDI QIDQ894017FDOQ894017

Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.004

Recommendations

• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Robust collusion with private information
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

zbMATH Keywords

collusionprivate informationrepeated gameoligopolyprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Incentives in Teams
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Folk theorem with communication
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Robust Collusion with Private Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals

Cited In (6)

• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs

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