Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.009zbMath1134.91331OpenAlexW2112120022MaRDI QIDQ926904

Bingyong Zheng

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprivate monitoringdelayed communicationeffective independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games

Cites Work

• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion