The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
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Publication:1604519
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2819zbMath1011.91015OpenAlexW2002756427MaRDI QIDQ1604519
Publication date: 4 July 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2819
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Cites Work
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
