Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
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Publication:996383
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.003zbMath1186.91034OpenAlexW1992981093MaRDI QIDQ996383
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.003
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Cites Work
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