A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.006MaRDI QIDQ848628zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bo Chen

Publication date 4 March 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremrepeated prisoner's dilemmaasymmetric private monitoringbelief-based approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(2)

• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

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