A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
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Publication:848628
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006zbMath1202.91023MaRDI QIDQ848628
Publication date: 4 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006
91A05: 2-person games
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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Cites Work
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