Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2878zbMath1050.91017OpenAlexW2021490856MaRDI QIDQ1604518

R. Smith

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1330.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative games2-person gamesmultistage and repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (22)

When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorem with communication ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring ⋮ Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

Cites Work

• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching

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