The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.006zbMATH Open1142.91360OpenAlexW2130122784MaRDI QIDQ869874FDOQ869874

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772

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zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Multistage Games with Communication
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Folk theorem with communication
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

Cited In (13)

• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
• Folk theorem with communication
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
• Communication and cooperation in repeated games
• Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
• Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
• ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games
• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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