The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:869874
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006zbMath1142.91360MaRDI QIDQ869874
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772
91A05: 2-person games
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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