On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90140-GzbMATH Open0733.90087MaRDI QIDQ810389FDOQ810389

Authors: Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated games with private informationsupergame equilibria with truthful revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Cited In (11)

• Repeated games with complete information
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• On the value of repetition for communication games
• Privacy, patience, and protection
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'

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