On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90140-GMaRDI QIDQ810389zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date 1991

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated games with private informationsupergame equilibria with truthful revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
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• Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3121285 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Cited in

(11)

• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
• On the value of repetition for communication games
• Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Repeated games with complete information
• Privacy, patience, and protection

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