On the value of repetition for communication games
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Cites work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Bad Reputation
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Insurance and taxation over the life cycle
- Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
- Repeated delegation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
- Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
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