On the value of repetition for communication games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009zbMath1466.91044OpenAlexW3153962754MaRDI QIDQ2031183

Delong Meng

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

rate of convergencedynamic mechanismsrepeated communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items

Repeated communication with private lying costs

Cites Work

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