How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.05.001zbMATH Open1371.91014OpenAlexW3122305169MaRDI QIDQ308633FDOQ308633

Authors: Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi 

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2029.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesrates of convergence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Dynamic programming, Markov chains, and the method of successive approximations
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
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• The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Heavy Traffic Limit Theorems for Queues: A Survey
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
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• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
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• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Rate of Convergence of Empirical Measures and Costs in Controlled Markov Chains and Transient Optimality
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games

Cited In (3)

• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• On the value of repetition for communication games
• Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games

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