How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 949662 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Dynamic programming, Markov chains, and the method of successive approximations
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
- Heavy Traffic Limit Theorems for Queues: A Survey
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Rate of Convergence of Empirical Measures and Costs in Controlled Markov Chains and Transient Optimality
- Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
- Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games
- The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
- The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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