Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games

DOI10.3982/ECTA20206MaRDI QIDQ6536588zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date 13 May 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20206

zbMATH Keywords

\(\chi^2\)-divergenceblind gamefolk theoremfrequent actionsmonitoring precisionoccupation measurerepeated gamesvariance decomposition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

Cites work

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• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• When are nonanonymous players negligible?

Cited in

(1)

• Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach

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