Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

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Cited in

(94)

A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
Repeated games with complete information
Solutions of the Häussler-von der Malsburg equations in manifolds with constant curvatures
Synergetic analysis of the Häussler-von der Malsburg equations for manifolds of arbitrary geometry
Path factors in cubic graphs
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
Problems in the Theory of Weak Interactions
Brownian motion and harnack inequality for Schrödinger operators
Rotation numbers for unions of circuits
Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
General properties of long-run supergames
Mesh partitioning for implicit computations via iterative domain decomposition: Impact and optimization of the subdomain aspect ratio
Local partitioned quantile regression
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1462935 (Why is no real title available?)
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
Folk theorem with communication
A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
Robust collusion with private information
Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
Plausible cooperation
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Introduction to enhanced C (EC)
Gained and Excluded Private Actions by Process Observations
Moral hazard and private monitoring
Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
Twisting modes
Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
Faking Patience with Tacit Collusion
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1347727 (Why is no real title available?)
Mathematically rigorous global optimization in floating-point arithmetic
Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
The 2-modular decomposition matrices of the symmetric groupsS₁₅S₁₆, andS₁₇
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
Exploiting problem structure in a genetic algorithm approach to a nurse rostering problem
Goodwill in communication
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Optimal collusion with internal contracting
Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Self-evident events and the value of linking
An adaptive multigrid finite‐volume scheme for incompressible Navier–Stokes equations
On numerical stability in large scale linear algebraic computations
``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games
Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
Order of limits in reputations
Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
Infinities in Quantum Gravities
Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
Some properties of 2-threshold graphs
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1542609 (Why is no real title available?)
Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring
Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach
Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1369837 (Why is no real title available?)
Communication and market sharing: an experiment on the exchange of soft and hard information
Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
Instability of belief-free equilibria
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
Interior curvature bounds for a class of curvature equations
Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication
On operator splitting of the Euler equations consistent with Harten's second‐order accurate TVD scheme
On sustaining cooperation without public observations
Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
On the existence of room frames of type t^u for u = 4 and 5
A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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