Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2460828zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi

Publication date 16 November 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196336

zbMATH Keywords

Folk theoremperfect public equilibriumrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
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• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
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• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring

Cites work

• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620858 (Why is no real title available?)
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(21)

• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
• A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
• A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
• Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
• Myopic perception in repeated games
• Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
• Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620864 (Why is no real title available?)
• Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
• Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
• Repeated games with complete information
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
• Stability in repeated matching markets
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• General properties of long-run supergames
• A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

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