A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011zbMath1250.91016OpenAlexW2035338132MaRDI QIDQ2276554

Bo Chen, Satoru Takahashi

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gameintertemporal tradefolk theoremunequal discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
• On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

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