A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
- On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
Cited in
(14)- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- Fairly taking turns
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620859 (Why is no real title available?)
- Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- The Pareto frontier of a finitely repeated game with unequal discounting
- On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
- On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting
- Intertemporal hedging and trade in repeated games with recursive utility
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
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