A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
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Publication:2276554
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011zbMath1250.91016OpenAlexW2035338132MaRDI QIDQ2276554
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011
Related Items (5)
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
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- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
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