A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011zbMath1250.91016MaRDI QIDQ2276554

Bo Chen, Satoru Takahashi

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

repeated game; intertemporal trade; folk theorem; unequal discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring, Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games, Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting, Myopic perception in repeated games

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