A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
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Publication:2276554
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.07.011zbMATH Open1250.91016OpenAlexW2035338132MaRDI QIDQ2276554FDOQ2276554
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011
Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
Cited In (9)
- Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games
- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- Fairly taking turns
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Intertemporal hedging and trade in repeated games with recursive utility
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
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