Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.003zbMath1138.91340OpenAlexW2080268841MaRDI QIDQ2507854

Julio González-Díaz

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcomplete informationfinite horizonrepeated gamesfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ When can limited randomness be used in repeated games? ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Commitment games ⋮ The role of commitment in repeated games

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

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