Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
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