Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.002zbMath1177.91042OpenAlexW3125619781MaRDI QIDQ2460828

David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 16 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196336

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesperfect public equilibriumFolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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