Stability in repeated matching markets

DOI10.3982/TE4898MaRDI QIDQ6180420zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.03794

zbMATH Keywords

Gale-Shapleymatchingrepeated gamesstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show that there are two kinds of hospitals in this repeated environment: some hospitals can be motivated dynamically to voluntarily reduce their hiring capacity, potentially making more residents available to rural hospitals; the others, however, are untouchable even with repeated interaction and must obtain the same match as they do in a static matching. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, at most a vanishingly small fraction of the hospitals are untouchable. The vast majority of hospitals can be motivated using dynamic incentives.

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Cited in

(5)

• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
• Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
• A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
• Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
• Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets

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