Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Decentralized job matching
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Cited in
(13)- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Domain-specific risk preference and cognitive ability
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Decentralized job matching
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching
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