A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:893408)
Recommendations
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Optimizing the marriage market: an application of the linear assignment model
- Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038736
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- Decentralized matching markets of various sizes: similarly stable solutions with high proportions of equal splits
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1541910 (Why is no real title available?)
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Decentralized job matching
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Marriage and Class
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
Cited in
(13)- A result on equilibrium matching with search frictions
- Monotonic matching in search equilibrium
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- Targeted search in matching markets
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching
- Marriage through friends
- The pre-marital investment game
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
This page was built for publication: A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q893408)
