A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.005zbMATH Open1369.91142OpenAlexW2152865367MaRDI QIDQ893408FDOQ893408

Qinggong Wu

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingstwo-sided matchingmarriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Marriage and Class
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• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Stable marriages and search frictions
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
• Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
• Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• Decentralized job matching
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems

Cited In (3)

• A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
• Stability in repeated matching markets
• Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching

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