A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
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Publication:893408
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.005zbMATH Open1369.91142OpenAlexW2152865367MaRDI QIDQ893408FDOQ893408
Authors: Qinggong Wu 
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005
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Cites Work
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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- Marriage and Class
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
- Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Decentralized job matching
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
Cited In (10)
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- Marriage through friends
- Monotonic matching in search equilibrium
- A result on equilibrium matching with search frictions
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs
- Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching
- The pre-marital investment game
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