A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
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Publication:893408
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005zbMath1369.91142OpenAlexW2152865367MaRDI QIDQ893408
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005
Related Items (3)
Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
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