Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2444196
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.032zbMath1284.91418OpenAlexW3125437892MaRDI QIDQ2444196
Matteo Triossi, Antonio Romero-Medina
Publication date: 8 April 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cea-uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/doctrab/ASOCFILE120110822091230.pdf
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