Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
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Publication:2444196
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(14)- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
- Unique stable matchings
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
- Efficient stable matching in school choice
- Classical matching via network formation
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
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