A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0803-1MaRDI QIDQ2513288zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Akahoshi

Publication date 2 February 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A further note on the stable matching problem
• Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

Cited in

(10)

• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
• Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
• An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?
• An impossibility theorem for matching problems

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