A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
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Publication:2513288
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1zbMath1306.91099OpenAlexW2168118328MaRDI QIDQ2513288
Publication date: 2 February 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1
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