Local and global consistency properties for student placement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:386062
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.03.002zbMath1280.91097MaRDI QIDQ386062
Publication date: 13 December 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.03.002
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B68: Matching models
Related Items
Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems, Incompatibility between stability and consistency, When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?, Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case, The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach, Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange, Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems, Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types, A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Consistent house allocation
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
